Jury selection

July 14, 2009

They're Out There

Andromeda 518876976_da84ccf0f9_m The New York Times had a nice article yesterday on conspiracy theorists, especially those who believe the Apollo moon landings were a government hoax.  It's a good reminder that -- unlike all the things they believe are out there -- conspiracy theorists really are out there, and on juries.

You know about the most widely held conspiracy theories:  moon landings a fraud, 9/11 attacks and the Holocaust hoaxes too, Elvis isn't dead, the CIA killed John F. Kennedy, and so on.  What you might not realize is how common it is to find a broader sort of "conspiracy mindset," an approach to the world, in jurors.

The lawyers did it

You'll see it, though, if you do a few mock trials.  Almost every mock trial I've worked on has had at least one person who could fairly be called a conspiracy theorist.  They're the folks who find gaps you never dreamed you'd left in the evidence (sometimes gaps that aren't there at all) and fill them by imagining dark secret dealings behind the scenes.  I'm not talking about legitimate inferences from suggestive evidence; I mean wacky conspiracies.  In one mock trial about contract negotiations that began, fell silent, and then recommenced after several months, a mock juror suggested to her group that the transaction lawyers on both sides of the deal must have had a secret agreement going.  In the observation room, eyebrows rose as the lawyers and clients realized that no one on the panel was going to contradict her.

Conspiracy theorists aren't simply common; they also have a lot in common, and that is separately important to trial lawyers.  Here's a character sketch from the New York Times article.  As you read it, think about which side wants this juror:

Ted Goertzel, a professor of sociology at Rutgers University who has studied conspiracy theorists, said “there’s a similar kind of logic behind all of these groups, I think.” For the most part, he explained, “They don’t undertake to prove that their view is true” so much as to “find flaws in what the other side is saying.” And so, he said, argument is a matter of accumulation instead of persuasion. “They feel if they’ve got more facts than the other side, that proves they’re right.”

Mark Fenster, a professor at the University of Florida Levin College of Law who has written extensively on conspiracy theories, said . . . at the core . . . is a polarization so profound that people end up with an unshakable belief that those in power “simply can’t be trusted.”

* * * *

Adam Savage, the co-star of the television show “MythBusters,” [said that the theorists] never give up. “They’ll say you have to keep an open mind,” he said, “but they reject every single piece of evidence that doesn’t adhere to their thesis.”

Got the picture?  Focused entirely on what the other side failed to prove, convinced that those in power are corrupt liars, and willing to argue longer than anyone else.  A prosecutor's nightmare, most of the time.  Definitely not the profile many business defendants are looking for.  But hardly a clear call for any party, even if you're accusing the other side of corruption.  These are forceful, voluble, unpredictable jurors who won't compromise.  Learn to recognize them where you can; and if you leave one on the jury, pack extra antacid in your briefcase. 

(Photo by xamad at http://www.flickr.com/photos/xamad/518876976/; license details there.)

July 01, 2009

What Have You Missed?

Michael jackson 3669419395_bbbb22c396_m The better the trial lawyer, the better her sense of what experiences have been important to other people -- that is, to jurors.  But we all have blind spots.  One of mine, it turns out, was Michael Jackson.

I know I risk losing subscribers when I say this, but I missed him entirely, or more accurately missed his music and his impact entirely.  He was almost exactly a year younger than I am, and we're both from northwest Indiana, so early on, I liked him a lot.  In junior high school, we all sang along with "Rockin' Robin."  But when his solo career started with songs like "Ben," I must have tuned out.  When "Thriller" came out in 1982, I was a young lawyer trying to stay calm with music I'd liked in college, and I just missed it all.  Before Jackson died, I couldn't have hummed a single line from "Billie Jean" or "Beat It."  I knew his biography included moonwalking and plastic surgeries and maybe oxygen tanks and allegedly pedophilia; if you'd asked me to describe him in two words, I probably would have picked sad and weird.

"An outsize, mesmerizing talent"

So I'm shaking my head as I watch footage of streets full of mourners, and listen to tributes from people of all ages and from all corners of the arts.  (Here's a collection of samples from Rolling Stone.)  Did Fred Astaire really say "That's the greatest dancer of the century"?  (I'm not linking because I can't find a solid source, but the quote is all over the web right now.)  Was Jackson really "in possession of an outsize, mesmerizing talent," as the New York Times summed it up?  Was he really a symbol of peace and hope to an entire "We Are The World" generation, as young fans on TV lined up to say into the microphone?

Apparently he was.  It wasn't that I'm too old (he had plenty of older fans) or that I disdain pop culture (I know far too many "Friends" episodes by heart).  It was just that his particular combination of personality and musical style didn't speak to me, so I ignored him.  I truly had no idea. 

What are you missing?

Here's the larger point for trial lawyers in this little memoir:  you're probably missing something too.  And it might not be small; it might be, like Michael Jackson, something that a lot of jurors would list among their greatest inspirations and influences.  It's worth pausing at moments like this to consider what you're missing, and whether you could open a little further to the experience of people who are not you.

(Photo by LainerJeanTater at http://www.flickr.com/photos/lainerjeantater/3669419395/in/set-72157620556773637/; license details there.)

April 20, 2009

Sleepers

Sleeping raccoon 853748895_eda8cc4b0f_m Two jurors who fell asleep have been replaced at an Ohio financial fraud trial heavy in testimony about bookkeeping and check-writing.

That's the opening line from an Associated Press story out of Akron yesterday, but unless you're following that particular trial (of former executives of Evergreen Homes), the main thing that's newsworthy is that these sleeping jurors made the paper while other jurors slept in trials all over America. 

It's been covered here before, but it's worth revisiting.  If you're a trial lawyer, you've seen jurors sleeping.  The key points are:

1.  People are tired.  Really, really tired.  They're holding two jobs, or staying up late with kids, or standing up all day, or all those things.  Put one of those folks in a chair, in a quiet room, with no talking required or even allowed, and it's amazing they stay awake as long as they do.  And like many things, our national fatigue is getting worse, not better.  The National Sleep Foundation's 2009 survey concludes that "The number of people reporting sleep problems has increased 13% since 2001. In the past eight years, the number of Americans who sleep less than six hours a night jumped from 13% to 20%, and those who reported sleeping eight hours or more dropped from 38% to 28%."  (The National Sleep Foundation is funded in large part by mattress and drug companies, but they claim research independence, and even if you discount their numbers, people are tired.)  On top of our other worries, nowadays we're losing sleep over the economy.  "One-third of Americans are losing sleep over the state of the U.S. economy and other personal financial concerns," the NSF said in March

2.  Fatigue affects decisionmaking.  Fatigue not only impairs memory and learning generally (Newsweek had an article last week summarizing recent research), but a a 2007 study suggests it specifically impairs moral judgment. 

3.  You can often spot fatigue in voir dire if you remember to look.  Tired jurors often look tired, will say they're tired, and will make you tired when they describe what they have to do in a typical day.  You'll miss it if you're focus only on themes and attitudes in jury selection. 

4.  Sustained sleepiness is reason to dismiss a juror.  In most courts and most states, this is a no-brainer.  A dozing juror can't hear the evidence and thus cannot decide the case on the same evidence as the others.  If a juror who keeps falling asleep isn't dismissed, it's usually because a lawyer forgot to ask, unless the trial has gone on so long and the panel is so small that the dismissal would mean (or threaten) a mistrial.

5.  You might be boring.  As we've noted, people are tired, so if a juror falls asleep while you're talking, it's usually not entirely your fault.  But think about whether it partly is.  The juror was awake earlier, right?  And if one juror slept through your expert's testimony, how many others daydreamed?  Even if your trial is "heavy in testimony about bookkeeping and check-writing," like that Akron fraud trial, you need to figure out how to make it interesting -- preferably before anybody falls asleep.

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Related posts here:

(Photo by Tambako the Jaguar at http://www.flickr.com/photos/tambako/853748895/; license details there, and follow the link to see the rest of his animal pictures, which are wonderful.)

March 31, 2009

Supreme Court: No Constitutional Right To Peremptory Challenge

Court_front_med   The embattled peremptory challenge got no help from the United States Supreme Court today in Rivera v. Illinois.  

Rivera tried to strike a juror in his Illinois state court trial.  The trial judge said no, finding a Batson violation, and seated the juror.  All sides agree now that was a mistake, and the peremptory strike was proper. 

So does Rivera get a new trial?  That's what he argued to the Supreme Court.  Finding hope in the Court's 1965 Swain v. Alabama pronouncement that "[t]he denial or impairment of the right [to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible error without a showing of prejudice," Rivera argued the trial judge's mistake violated his constitutional right to due process. 

Not nobody, not nohow

Absolutely no way, the Supreme Court basically said.  (To underscore the point, the opinion was unanimous, and Justice Ginsburg wrote it.)  Here's the constitutional law of peremptory challenges as it stands on this day:

  • "If a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court's good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern. Rather, it is a matter for the State to address under its own laws."
  • "[T]his Court has consistently held that there is no freestanding constitutional right to peremptory challenges."
  • "Because peremptory challenges are within the States' province to grant or withhold, the mistaken denial of a state-provided peremptory challenge does not, without more, violate the Federal Constitution."

Any questions?

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The opinion is Rivera v. Illinois.  Related posts here:

March 10, 2009

Is Batson Wrong?

Race 301093262_174030cdb5_m Just my luck.  I leave town for two days, away from the Internet for once in my life, and the blogosphere decides to spend the whole time talking about peremptory challenges to potential jurors. 

Peremptory strikes, the cons and pros (and pros and pros)

It started with an article by Nathan Koppel in the Wall Street Journal, discussing proposed reforms to the peremptory challenge system, including eliminating them altogether.   The reformers point to a problem that's real:  knowing they aren't allowed to strike jurors because of race, gender, or ethnicity, lawyers contort their explanations in ways that seem to be either ridiculous excuses or transparently racial code.  One of the casualties is the credibility of the whole justice system.

Bloggers on trial law took note.  The WSJ Law Blog simply reviewed the article, and Juries used a long quote.  But Walter Olson at Overlawyered said he's long supported getting rid of peremptories, and was tempted too by one reform idea in the WSJ article, limiting them to three per side, no matter what kind of case or where. 

Defenders of the peremptory strike ran to their keyboards and wrote one terrific post after another.  It may have been the best two days for jury blogging in history.  There were two posts from Mark Bennett (here and here), Scott Greenfield of course, two different authors from the blog Popehat (Patrick and Ken), and in his great new blog JuryVox, consultant Dennis Elias weighed in. 

I favor peremptory strikes.  I'm a practicing lawyer, not a theorist, and I know that in the courtroom, the peremptory system adds to the fairness and efficiency of trials, even when so many lawyers use it poorly.  And I can't imagine a thing I could say in favor of peremptory strikes that wasn't said more cogently in one of those great posts last week. 

The problem with Batson

One thing does seem worth adding, though -- a thought that isn't really part of the discussion, but instead about the reason we're having it.  It isn't just clumsy, racially motivated lawyers who have driven us to have to defend peremptory strikes.  It's Batson itself, the case that prohibited racially motivated strikes in the first place.

Is Batson wrong?  Not in its intent, or its immediate result.  In Batson's trial -- and many others, then and sometimes now -- the jury selection was simply racist.  The Batson court was right to end this shame.   But the court's reasoning left us with a false choice that is itself tainting jury selection today.

The Batson court divided the universe of peremptory strikes into two categories:  those with a "racially discriminatory purpose," and those that are "racially neutral."  If we can infer from your strikes that you're "discriminatory," the only way to save them is to convince the judge you're "neutral."  The literature, case law, and blog posts on Batson for the most part accept this distinction without question -- like last week's WSJ article, which talked about "the tricky question of when peremptory challenges cross the line into discrimination."

 But the distinction is wrong.  You know it's wrong.  Consider:

  • You're defending a black man in a knife assault case.  A black prospective juror says two of her family members have been assaulted with knives in separate incidents.  She and her extended family all live in a high-crime neighborhood that is almost entirely African-American, and she has started an anti-crime program on her block.

  • You're defending that same case and a white prospective juror says she avoids driving through the inner-city neighborhood where the assault happened, and has never known anyone who was arrested for a serious crime.  She lives in an affluent white neighborhood. 

  • You're defense counsel in a medical malpractice case involving medical research studies, and an African-American prospective juror tells you she is highly suspicious of doctors and tests.  You're aware of the studies (here's one) showing that many African-Americans feel deep distrust of medicine and medical research.

 

In each case, is your peremptory strike meant to be "racially discriminatory," or is it "racially neutral"?  It certainly is not meant to discriminate, and I'd argue strongly that each of those strikes is appropriate.  But neither is it "neutral," in any sense except the way that courts applying Batson have come to redefine that word as they try to shoehorn strikes into one label or the other.  It's something we need another word for, like "racially complicated." 

Americans spent most of the election year 2008 teaching ourselves every day that race matters -- in ways we expect and in ways we don't, in the way we influence each other in groups and the way we think privately.  It matters because race, and the economic and social status that often come with race, are among the primary forces shaping each person's experiences.  That lesson has made our conversations about politics a lot more interesting -- but when we talk about other issues, like jury selection, it's as though we paid no attention at all.  "Discriminatory or neutral?" is a question with no right answer, and when we make lawyers answer it anyway, we shouldn't be surprised when the responses sound silly.

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Related posts here: 

 

(Photo by Photocapy, one of the very best photos on Flickr, at http://www.flickr.com/photos/photocapy/301093262/; license details there.)




February 02, 2009

More Harmless Than Harmless? The Mother Who Was Locked Out Of Voir Dire

Private keep out 626790274_e499e63dfc_m Robert Gibbons was tried in what apparently was a very small courtroom in Goshen, New York, for the rape of his 15-year-old daughter.  He had told the police, “it was mutual, I didn’t rape her.”  That’s a conviction that many people – including, it seems, a series of appellate and postconviction judges -- would naturally want very much to stand.

She only wanted to see her son’s trial

As jury selection was about to begin, only one spectator sat in the courtroom:  Mr. Gibbons’s mother, who of course was also the victim's grandmother.  The trial judge told her she had to leave.  The courtroom was too small, he said, and he was not “going to taint the entire jury pool” by “put[ting] a relative right next to a potential juror.” Defense counsel asked if she could sit in the “well” just behind counsel table.  No, said the trial judge,  “[n]o one goes in the well unless it’s their attorneys or part of the defense team.”  That would “cause more problems,” he said, like security, or the jury wondering who this woman was.

The courtroom was thus closed to the public – that is, to the only member of the public who wanted to be there – for the entire afternoon of the first day of trial.  The next morning, enough jurors had been excused to free up some seats, and the defendant’s mother was allowed back in.

This was not the trial of Osama bin Laden.”

In its opinion last week deciding Gibbons’s habeas petition, the Second Circuit had no trouble with the law.  Defendants have a constitutional right to a public trial in both state and federal court; that’s the holding of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Waller v. Georgia, decided in 1984.  The denial of a public trial is a “structural error,” meaning it’s one that courts aren’t permitted to ignore even if they find the error was harmless; Waller said that too. 

And, the court went on, the closure of Gibbons’s voir dire was not justified under the standards that Waller set out.  The trial judge’s security concern was silly (“this was not the trial of Osama bin Laden,” the court said), as was the purported concern that jurors would wonder who the mother was (“we do not understand what difference it would make”).  Nor did the trial judge look hard enough for alternatives.  In a note to future trial judges with small courtrooms, the court noted, the trial court could have:

  • “Accepted defense counsel’s suggestion to have Gibbons’s mother sit behind counsel, or in some other part of, the 'well;'
  • “Called fewer jurors at the start, leaving some room for spectators;
  • “Required either a member of the venire or Gibbons’s mother to stand until a seat became vacant; or
  • “Moved the proceedings to a larger courtroom — an option the court considered on the second day of voir dire. “

(He could have moved jury selection out of the courthouse, too.  I once consulted in a voir dire held in a popular banquet hall across town.)

voiding a trial . . . seems to us unimaginable.”

Will Gibbons get a new trial, then, since the Second Circuit has found that his first one was tainted by structural error?  He will not.  The court turned to a “trivial error” theory that has no basis in Supreme Court case law but which the Second Circuit has used once before, in Peterson v. Williams in 1996.  In essence, this theory says to the Supreme Court, Surely you don’t mean we have to overturn a conviction when the error was this harmless:

The contention that . . . a brief and trivial mistake could require voiding a criminal trial of many months duration seems to us unimaginable. Whether the explanation would be that so trivial an exclusion did not constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment, or that there was a violation but too trivial to justify voiding the trial, we do not know. But we believe that, regardless of which explanation would be given, the result would be to allow the conviction to stand. We must speculate because the Supreme Court has never ruled on such a question.

And so Gibbons’s conviction will stand.  “Nothing of significance happened” in the courtroom that closed afternoon, the court said.  “We need not rule on the metaphysical question whether, in view of the triviality of the incident, it was not a deprivation of a constitutional right, or in contrast, it was a violation of a constitutional right, but, in spite of the inapplicability of the harmless error rule, too trivial to justify vacating the state court’s judgment.”

Questions

Metaphysical for some people, I guess.  Worrisome for others.  Where are we going with this?  The other “structural” errors include denial of counsel; can trial courts now hold an afternoon of voir dire without a defense lawyer, as long as “nothing of significance” happens?  Will the Supreme Court, fresh from finally carving a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, decide that it likes this distinction between harmless and trivial?  Will the answers to these constitutional questions be different because we wanted to protect a young woman from having to testify twice?

I’m troubled too by the image of that courtroom in Goshen, and the mother – the grandmother – who had to wait outside.  If she had been a reporter, or if she had been a man, would the trial judge have found a way to let her stay?  I wish she’d had a lawyer of her own that day.

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Notes:

  1. The case is Gibbons v. Savage, decided January 28.  The opinion itself doesn’t say where the trial took place, but the New York Appellate Division opinion does.
  2. New York lawyer Stephen Bernstein, who wrote about this case last week, practices in Orange County (Goshen is the county seat), remembers that “the old criminal courtrooms were certainly tiny and smaller than most law school moot courtrooms.”

(Photo by takomabibelot at http://flickr.com/photos/takomabibelot/626790274/; license details there.)

January 13, 2009

Stereotyping Jurors: What Would Clarence Darrow Do?

438px-Clarence_Darrow Sunday’s post here asked where on earth a New York prosecutor could have read, as the state claimed in a recent Second Circuit Batson case, that “that heavy-set people tend to be very sympathetic toward any defendant.”  Lawyer and jury consultant Mark Stanziano wrote me wondering if Clarence Darrow might have said it.  “Darrow had lots of thoughts about heavy set people, thin people, Baptists, Methodists, lots of stereotypes,” Mark wrote. “It was the way he saw the world and the people in it.  Clearly, a different age, but one the prosecutor may have ‘read about.’”

Mark pointed me to an article Darrow wrote in the May 1936 issue of Esquire, called "How to Pick A Jury."  It’s set out in full as part of a Darrow site maintained by Prof.  Douglas Linder of the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.  Overweight jurors aren’t mentioned in the article; but stereotypes definitely are.

There is no sure rule”

You may have seen this article before, but read it again.  It’s an amazing document.  (Click through to Linder’s site and read the whole thing, not just the excerpts here; I’d reprint it all, but I can’t quickly figure out the copyright situation.)  Some of it is the kind of astute and measured advice you’d hope for from Clarence Darrow, like remembering who will empathize with your client, and what our “entire environment” teaches us:

If the client is a landlord, a banker, or a manufacturer, or one of that type, then jurors sympathetic to that class will be wanted in the box; a man who looks neat and -trim and smug. He will be sure to guard your interests as he would his own. His entire environment has taught him that all real values are measured in cash, and he knows no other worth. Every knowing lawyer seeks for a jury of the same sort of men as his client; men who will be able to imagine themselves in the same situation and realize what verdict the client wants.

His reminder not to rely on a single quality of any juror is modern and apt:

Choosing jurors is always a delicate task. The more a lawyer knows of life, human nature, psychology, and the reactions of the human emotions, the better he is equipped for the subtle selection of his so-called "twelve men, good and true." In this undertaking, everything pertaining to the prospective juror needs to be questioned and weighed: his nationality, his business, religion, politics, social standing, family ties, friends, habits of life and thought; the books and newspapers he likes and reads, and many more matters that combine to make a man; all of these qualities and experiences have left their effect on ideas, beliefs and fancies that inhabit his mind. Understanding of all this cannot be obtained too bluntly. It usually requires finesse, subtlety and guesswork. Involved in it all is the juror's method of speech, the kind of clothes he wears, the style of haircut, and, above all, his business associates, residence and origin.

He is cutting-edge when he reminds lawyers that individual experiences easily trump stereotypes:

There is no sure rule by which one can gauge any person. A man may seem to be of a certain mold, but a wife, a friend, or an enemy, entering into his life, may change his views, desires and attitudes, so that he will hardly recognize himself as the man he once seemed to be.

“If a Presbyterian enters the jury box and carefully rolls up his umbrella . . .”

But when you come to Darrow’s advice on “the nationality, politics, and religion of the person examined for the jury,” you’ll wonder how he ever won a case.  Here’s his cheerfully broad-brush rundown of potential jurors for the “underdog”:

An Irishman is called into the box for examination. There is no reason for asking about his religion; he is Irish; that is enough. We may not agree with his religion, but it matters not, his feelings go deeper than any religion. You should be aware that he is emotional, kindly and sympathetic. If he is chosen as a juror, his imagination will place him in the dock; really, he is trying himself. You would be guilty of malpractice if you got rid of him, except for the strongest reasons.

An Englishman is not so good as an Irishman, but still, he has come through a long tradition of individual rights, and is not afraid to stand alone; in fact, he is never sure that he is right unless the great majority is against him. The German is not so keen about individual rights except where they concern his own way of life; liberty is not a theory, it is a way of living. Still, he wants to do what is right, and he is not afraid. He has not been among us long, his ways are fixed by his race, his habits are still in the making. We need inquire no further. If he is a Catholic, then he loves music and art; he must be emotional, and will want to help you; give him a chance.

If a Presbyterian enters the jury box and carefully rolls up his umbrella, and calmly and critically sits down, let him go. He is cold as the grave; he knows right from wrong, although he seldom finds anything right. He believes in John Calvin and eternal punishment. Get rid of him with the fewest possible words before he contaminates the others; unless you and your clients are Presbyterians you probably are a bad lot, and even though you may be a Presbyterian, your client most likely is guilty.

If possible, the Baptists are more hopeless than the Presbyterians. They, too, are apt to think that the real home of all outsiders is Sheol, and you do not want them on the jury, and the sooner they leave the better. The Methodists are worth considering; they are nearer the soil. Their religious emotions can be transmuted into love and charity. They are not half bad; even though they will not take a drink, they really do not need it so much as some of their competitors for the seat next to the throne. If chance sets you down between a Methodist and a Baptist, you will move toward the Methodist to keep warm.

Beware of the Lutherans, especially the Scandinavians; they are almost always sure to convict. Either a Lutheran or Scandinavian is unsafe, but if both in one, plead your client guilty and go down the docket. He learns about sinning and punishing from the preacher, and dares not doubt. A person who disobeys must be sent to hell; he has God's word for that.

As to Unitarians, Universalists, Congregationalists, Jews and other agnostics, don't ask them too many questions; keep them anyhow, especially Jews and agnostics. It is best to inspect a Unitarian, or a Universalist, or a Congregationalist with some care, for they may be prohibitionists; but never the Jews and the real agnostics! And do not, please, accept a prohibitionist; he is too solemn and holy and dyspeptic. He knows your client would not have been indicted unless he were a drinking man, and anyone who drinks is guilty of something, probably much worse than he is charged with, although it is not set out in the indictment. Neither would he have employed you as his lawyer had he not been guilty.

And so on, through Christian Scientists, the wealthy, and those who laugh easily and those who do not.  (“By all means, choose a man who laughs.”) 

“Then too,” Darrow says, “there are the women,” then newly eligible for jury service:

Women still take their new privilege seriously. They are all puffed up with the importance of the part they feel they play, and are sure they represent a great step forward in the world. They believe that the sex is co-operating in a great cause. Like the rest of us, they do not know which way is forward and which is backward, or whether either one is any way at all. Luckily, as I feel, my services were almost over when women invaded the jury box.

[In a trial a] few years ago . . . the courtroom looked ominous with women jurors. I managed to get rid of all but two, while the dismissed women lingered around in the big room waiting for the victory, wearing solemn faces and white ribbons. The jury disagreed. In the second trial there were four women who would not budge from their seats or their verdict. Once more I went back to the case with distrust and apprehension. The number of women in the jury box had grown to six. All of them were unprejudiced. They said so. But everyone connected with the case was growing tired and skeptical, so we concluded to call it a draw. This was my last experience with women jurors. I formed a fixed opinion that they were absolutely dependable, but I did not want them.

It’s remarkable that there was a day when you could say things like this, much less publish them in a national magazine. 

The challenge now

I can’t help wondering whether, in the early part of the last century, stereotypes like this might have been more useful than they are now.  That was a world when immigrants often lived together in tight communities and neighborhoods, often doing business and worshiping in the old language.  Perhaps the thinking of a group member then matched that of the group more closely than it does today.  And when it didn’t match – as Darrow’s better advice shows he knew it didn’t always – it was an era when it was habitual to think and talk in stereotypes anyway.

We need to leave Darrow’s stereotyping behind, but not his effort, or his insight.  Darrow actually draws some wonderfully accurate psychological sketches in these wacky paragraphs.  What’s different is that the types aren’t linked to gender, religion and heritage anymore, if they ever were.  What today’s lawyer needs to do is sense the unique character of the Scotch/Irish/Scandinavian banker juror, raised Catholic and now a practicing Buddhist, married to a Jewish social worker with whom he has four children, one a disabled adult. 

And by the way, that juror is overweight.  If you strike him, or keep him, is that the reason?

(Public domain photograph of Darrow at Wikipedia.)

January 11, 2009

Overweight Jurors Are . . .

Scale 3082059555_5207fca723_m How's this for a race-neutral reason to strike a black juror?

I do not select overweight people on the jury panel for reasons that, based on my reading and past experience, that heavy-set people tend to be very sympathetic toward any defendant.

So said the prosecutor in Seth Dolphy's 1997 New York trial on drug, weapon, and assault charges, and the trial judge was fine with it.  Last Friday the Second Circuit basically said hey wait a minute, that's not Batson, and remanded to the federal district court to take another look at habeas corpus.  Since the trial judge hadn't given any serious consideration to the possibility that the "fat" explanation was a pretext, the court said, the conviction should be overturned unless the state could somehow convince the trial judge, now eleven years later, that the prosecutor was sincere.  

Where is it written?

On the off chance the prosecutor ever takes the stand, I have a question.  You strike overweight jurors "based on [your] reading"?  Where the heck did you read that?

I could have missed it, but I don't know of any research on the attitudes of overweight jurors.  (Or any that would answer the Second Circuit's tart question, "Which side is favored by skinny jurors?")  There is plenty of research on how jurors and others judge overweight witnesses and parties, especially since "obesity litigation" against fast-food companies and others started to appear.  In fact there's so much of that research that searching for research about overweight jurors is difficult, but I'm not seeing it in literature reviews either. 

Maybe the prosecutor had seen Stephen Adler's 1995 book/critique, The Jury:  Trial and Error in the American Courtroom.  Adler, according to Walter Olson's review at the time, attributes to defense lawyer Gerry Spence the notion that "fat people lacked self-control and wouldn't demand as much law-abiding discipline from others."  Heaven knows Gerry Spence can speak for himself, but whether he said that or not, I bet his actual thought process in voir dire is more subtle. 

Regardless of where it came from, did this idea somehow make it into prosecutors' voir dire seminars in the mid-1990s?  If so, is it still there?  If so, can we get rid of it?

Answers you already knew

Let's drop the stereotypes just for a minute and think about how many different ways being overweight might affect a juror.  I'm probably missing several, but here's a start:

  • Overweight people often believe they are discriminated against, and they're right.  This might make one angry at an authority figure like the state; another ready to punish a defendant; and a third perhaps ready to be a holdout, feeling distant from the rest of the group.  Or it might have no effect.  It depends on the juror and the case.
  • Overweight people have more health problems than thin people.  This might make jury service, with its long days of sitting still, more difficult for them.  One might respond with energy and commitment, another with cynicism.
  • Overweight people are, obviously, overweight, and thus may be less likely themselves to be biased against your overweight client, or witness, or self.  (There's a study here whose abstract suggests this.)
  • Overweight people (at least overweight women, according to this study) often have impaired romantic relationships.  A juror who had experienced this might listen differently to the evidence in a domestic abuse or sexual abuse case. 

Most important, overweight people are people.  Each one is as unique as you are.  Each one's story contains moments as life-shaping as yours have been.  You knew this, of course -- but if your "reading" about jury selection is full of garbage like "heavy-set people tend to be very sympathetic toward any defendant," you may hesitate to trust what you know when voir dire begins. 

Don't let anybody tell you that you never want overweight jurors, or that you always want them -- or that you never or always want any other group.  It just isn't true.

___________________

Source notes:  The Second Circuit opinion is Dolphy v. Mantello, discussed at the WSJ Law Blog and Althouse as well as here. 

Related posts here: 

(Photo by Lee Carson at http://www.flickr.com/photos/tcatcarson/3082059555/; license details there.)

 

December 29, 2008

Jurors Take A Holiday

Christmas tree 310048508_84f87f613b_m Are you picking a jury on January 5?  Be glad you won't have me on the panel.

If you're still picking jurors by demographic profile alone, you might think you want someone like me.  I'm fairly educated, a lawyer, a parent, a blogger, pretty senior at my office and thus used to leading project groups -- that's not the right juror for every case, but I might be a good candidate for yours.

Bread from a cold oven!

Except that during the holidays, I look nothing like that profile.  Over the last few weeks, the burning issues in my life have been questions like these:

--Will I ever find a recipe for pourable royal icing that's right for the fruitcake recipe I love?  The cookbook author doesn't give one because she says you can find it in "any general cookbook."  That might have been true when she wrote it, but times have changed.  (Answer:  I think I've got this right now.  And the fruitcake really is good, I swear.)

--Can you really bake bread in a clay pot starting from a cold oven, so the bread bakes while the oven preheats?  No more trying to fill the hot oven up with steam when you put the loaf in?  (Answer:  you really can.  I am unduly excited about this.)

--Will the gift book I made on Blurb.com turn out all right?  (Answer:  It was pretty spectacular.  Huge thumbs up for Blurb.com.)

--Will my relatives get in all right?  And will they get out all right?  (Answer:  They did, through snow and fog and storm.)

--Where the heck did I find the recipe I used that one year when I got the sweet potatoes right?  (Answer:  My old copy of The Joy of Cooking, but I didn't figure this out until I had messed them up yet again.)

--Will I really finish, for the first time, the Concept 2 indoor rowing "holiday challenge," joining three of my family members to row 200,000 indoor meters (at my slow pace that's close to 45 minutes a day) between Thanksgiving and Christmas Eve?  (Answer:  I did!)

I kept up on client work, of course, but the rest of my lawyer/blogger life was far away.  If I were in your jury box next week, I'd try to listen to you, but you'd be competing with the bread recipes in my head.

Not just baking

I'm not the only one who's distracted over the holidays, in ways that may not be predictable from a "profile."  This time of year is hard on relationships, for example.  I'm convinced that I see more requests for referrals to divorce lawyers between Christmas and Valentine's Day than in the entire rest of the year.  Jurors who need to "do something" about their elderly parents' living situation or their college student's mental health issues are thinking harder about it right now.  What was just financial anxiety the rest of the year may be closer to financial panic this week -- in any year, and especially this year.

If you're picking a jury in the next few weeks, try to remember that -- now even more than usual -- you are not the most important thing in their lives.  Find non-obnoxious ways to keep their attention and to make sure your key points get through.  Ask them how their holidays were, and listen to what they say. 

And speaking of holidays, I hope yours have been great.

(Photo by Chris Metcalf at http://www.flickr.com/photos/laffy4k/310048508/; license details there.)

 

December 03, 2008

Six Mistakes That Can Mess Up Voir Dire

Error 404 2891898817_71620104ff_m Most of the legal talk about the Lori Drew case has been about the charges, not the jury.  But the jury story that did come out this week reinforces a whole series of lessons about voir dire.

Didn't read the terms of service?  "Absolutely you should be held liable"

Ms. Drew is the "MySpace mom" who harassed 13-year-old Megan Meier with a fake MySpace page.  She may not have meant for Megan to commit suicide, but that's what happened.  Ms. Drew was convicted last week of misdemeanor charges, but acquitted of felonies, and many question whether the charges against her will survive on appeal.  The prosecution's theory was that Ms. Drew committed a crime when she violated MySpace's "terms of service" by setting up a fake profile.  As Emily Bazelon wrote in Slate today, those terms of service, like most of what we all click yes to on the Internet, are "a long series of legalistic paragraphs that just about nobody really reads."

So when jury foreperson Valentina Kunasz told the press this week that she does always read Internet terms of service, and "If you choose to be lazy and not go through that entire agreement or contract of agreement, then absolutely you should be held liable" and maybe go to prison if things turn out badly, it made Scott Greenfield mad at the whole jury system: 

In this case, given its notoriety and attention, the effort to find fair-minded jurors, how did H. Dean Steward end up with the only person in the world who actually reads the terms of service?  Worse still, one who has such a chip on their shoulder that they believe anyone who does not read the TOS is lazy and should go to prison for it?  . . . [I]f jury selection, the process in all its art and science, fulfills its purported purpose, how could this have happened?  Or is it all just voodoo?

Scott and I go back and forth on the whole is-it-voodoo thing, and he has made some strong points on the subject.  But he has this one all wrong.  It wasn't some unpredictable mystery of the jury system that let Valentina Kunasz slip onto the Drew jury panel.  Her presence there was completely preventable.

One of three things happened here.  Ms. Kunasz was asked whether she reads terms of service and she told the truth; she was asked and she lied; or she wasn't asked.  If she told the truth, we don't have an issue, since that means the lawyers knew this fact and kept her anyway.  If she lied, then the problem isn't jury selection.  (I doubt that happened; presumably Wired would have reported it, as they reported much of the Drew voir dire in detail and also the Kunasz interview.)  And if she wasn't asked, well, that's not the jury system's fault.

Six mistakes

I have no information to criticize either side's voir dire in the Drew case, and I wouldn't do it even if I knew more.  This post is about the rest of us, not the Drew lawyers -- because the story brings to mind some of the ways a good lawyer could have failed to ask Ms. Kunasz if she was a terms-of-service reader and regretted it later.  Here are six of them, mistakes lawyers make all the time: 

1.  They don't allow enough time to plan voir dire.  Every Sunday night, this blog gets the same search hit over and over:  "Sample voir dire questions." 

It's clear what's going on.  All over the country, trials are starting on Monday.  The lawyers finally have everything else ready, and they are turning to voir dire.  They'll put together a good list, maybe do a fine job, but if they'd started earlier, they would have done better.

The earlier you start, and the more different times you revisit the project, the better your voir dire questions will be.  Each time you take a break and then return to your draft questions, you'll be amazed at the new questions that jump to your mind -- suddenly obvious, but somehow missed before.

2.  They don't plan voir dire in a systematic way.  If you try to plan voir dire by listing every question that comes to mind -- and many lawyers do it that way -- you'll end up with a lot of questions, and you'll miss a lot more.  You need a system that will prompt you to think of what doesn't come to mind. 

I've suggested some starting points for a systematic approach, here and here.  However you shape your system, be sure it includes the elements of the crime (or the civil cause of action) and the defenses asserted.  As to each element, whatever else you ask, you need to ask whether anybody has done that, or had it done to them.  Somehow this is easier to remember when the case is about something most people haven't done, like shooting someone in self-defense.  But if the case is about reading the terms of service, then that's what you ask about.

3.  They don't ask about experiences.  Lawyers too often jump to the punch line, asking jurors how they feel about the issues in the case.  Depending on how good you are at it, this technique falls somewhere between incomplete and useless, mostly because jurors often aren't very good at understanding or describing their attitudes.  Ask anyway, but ask also about what has happened to them, and about what they've done.  Very often you can understand them better from there. 

4.  They don't ask for follow-up questions in judge-conducted voir dire.  Lori Drew's trial was in federal court, and the stories I've seen refer only to questioning by Judge George Wu, not by the lawyers.  Again, I don't know what happened; maybe the lawyers asked for follow-up questions and didn't get them, or maybe they got them, or maybe they didn't ask.  But in general, it's remarkable how many lawyers write good voir dire questions for judges to ask in federal court, but neglect to ask for follow-up questions. 

5.  They get tangled up in paper questionnaires.  The Drew jurors answered what sounds like an extensive written questionnaire.  (I've looked for a copy and can't find it, even on PACER; if you have it and would share, please let me know.)  Questionnaires are great, of course -- an effective way to ask questions that would be difficult to ask in person, and to take a little time to think about the answers.  But when you have questionnaires, you need to be ready to handle the information they contain.  Too often lawyers find themselves standing in front of the jury box leafing through an armload of paper.  Sometimes that's unavoidable, but avoid it if you can.

6.  They don't question young working-class women.  Valentina Kunasz is a 25-year-old former hairdresser.  If there's anyone in the world who's likely to be under-questioned in voir dire, that's the profile.  Lawyers know they can't take all day on voir dire, so they often spend more time on jurors they think are likely to be leaders in the group:  educated jurors, jurors who supervise others at work, jurors with more life experiences, and yes, male jurors.  If a 25-year-old unemployed (I assume that's what "former" means) female hairdresser isn't volunteering, in many trials she wouldn't get to say much at all.

It's important to look for leaders in voir dire, and to try to understand them as fully as you can once you find them.  But it's also important to suspend your preconceptions while you're looking, and to make sure everybody speaks.  As Judge Gregory Mize has explained, the silent ones can surprise you.

________________________

Related posts here:

Update:  Gideon, who has been following the legal issues in the Drew case, posts on the juror story here

Cartoon by Roberto Zingales, coolroz@yahoo.com 2008)

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